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Abstract. The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification 
of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission 
targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by 
(bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical 
simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for 
the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be 
able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate 
uncertainty on emissions. 
Key words: carbon, emissions trading, monitoring, simulation, uncertainty 
JEL classification: Q35, Q3 
1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol was established in 1997 under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 19920. The main objective of 
the Convention is to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. For each country 
taking part (referred to as Party), the Protocol specifies an emission level not 
to be exceeded in the period 2008-2012 (UNFCCC 1997). However, Article 17 
allows for emission trading between the industrialized Parties to the Protocol. This 
means that each Party, or signatory of the Protocol, has the possibility to exceed 
their prescribed emission level given that another Party carries out an equivalent 
emission reduction such that the aggregate emission level remains constant. The 
Protocol also specifies that the Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant 
principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting 
and accountability for emissions trading. So far, however, little progress has been 
made on defining an appropriate verification mechanism. 
Montgomery (1972) demonstrated that the least cost solution of reaching the 
aggregate target of pollution reduction agreements could be realized through 
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trading in emission permits. The cost-effective solution can be computed and 
implemented if the abatement cost functions for all countries are known. However, 
if a permit buyer reveals its abatement cost function, the seller can use this infor-
mation when bargaining on a permit price such that the buyer is worse off than 
she otherwise would be. Hence, Parties have incentives to keep this information 
private and the specific costs of emission reductions remain unknown. Acknowl-
edging this asymmetric information problem, Ermoliev et al. (2000) proposed a 
decentralized optimization procedure which can be viewed as a specific Walrasian 
tatonnement process simulating a scheme of sequential bilateral trade. The element 
we want to add to the existing analysis of emission trade is that emissions of GHGs 
are in general not directly measurable and assessments of GHG emissions are 
thus uncertain. On the basis of specific emission factors, emissions can be esti-
mated with information on GHG-emitting activities. These activities are assessed 
by a national agency in each Party and the inferred emission levels are reported 
to the Convention Secretariat according to specific guidelines developed by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1997). The accuracy of the 
estimated emissions depends on inter alia the quality of the monitoring system in 
each specific country and on the accuracy of the emission factors used (c.f. Rypdal 
and Zhang 2000). 
Several papers have examined the relation between uncertainty on (actual) 
emissions and emissions trading. Victor (1991: 213) identifies the problem of 
uncertainty by writing " . .. it is instructive to separate the ends and means of pollu-
tion control. The ends may be agreed upon even in the face of great uncertainty, but 
in designing the mechanism for achieving those ends uncertainty and complexity 
can prove to be extreme obstacles. This is especially true when highly quantified 
strategies such as markets are employed." Swart (1993) analyzes the possibility 
of including sinks and sources of greenhouse gases other than fossil fuel carbon 
emissions in a comprehensive greenhouse gas trading program. He concludes that, 
also in the light of uncertainty on the actual emission some gases (methane and 
nitrous oxide) should not yet be included in a global greenhouse gas trading regime. 
Farrel et al. (1999) mention different sources of uncertainty surrounding the NOx 
trading program in the northeastern part of the USA. They note that uncertainty on 
monitored emissions requires accurate measurements so as to minimize uncertain-
ties. Carlson and Sholtz (1999) examine the impact of uncertainty on actual 
emission levels on the optimal design of emission trading schemes so as to limit 
price volatility and conclude that staggered (overlapping) issuing of permits may 
enhance the effectiveness of a reconciliation period in reducing volatility. Godby 
et al. (1998) report on experiments that investigate the impact of uncertainty on 
production levels and hence emissions on price instabilities. They find that banking 
reduces price volatility. Montero (2000) looks at the optimal design of an emission 
trading program given that firms can opt-in to an existing trading program and their 
baseline emissions are uncertain. He concludes that the first-best equilibrium can 
be attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt-in firms. 
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As emissions of greenhouse gases cannot be observed perfectly, we assume that 
Parties ' reported emissions differ from actual emissions because of uncertainty. 
We call this difference the uncertain volume of emissions or briefly uncertain 
emissions. In this paper we consider only the simplest case of non-stochastic 
uncertainty, i.e., when uncertain emissions are characterized only by possible 
ranges without specifying their likelihoods. It allows us to picture a simple verifica-
tion rule that implies that when there is uncertainty on actual emissions the Protocol 
will require that the reported emissions plus the estimated uncertainty in the emis-
sion must be below the Kyoto target of that Party. This verification rule follows 
earlier work by Obersteiner et al. (2000a, b) and Jonas et al. (1999, 2000) on 
uncertainty and verification. Such a rule allows each Party to reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding the amount of reported emissions by investing in uncertainty reduc-
tion. Other alternatives would be to disallow sources (or even countries) with high 
levels of uncertainties to trade or to prescribe countries to meet certain minimum 
standards of uncertainty. From an economic perspective these alternatives seems to 
be less attractive than our rule since our approach creates the right incentives and 
minimizes overall costs on an idiosyncratic basis. The general case of stochastic 
uncertainty requires a more sophisticated approach, for example the use of risk 
functions associated with the "portfolio" of emissions similar to the Markowitz's 
( 1987) model. 
In practice the availability of reliable data on the uncertainty surrounding the 
emissions is poor. With the exception of large industrial sources greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions are usually estimated rather than measured directly. These esti-
mates are usually based on activity data and emission factors (emissions per unit of 
activity). The easiest way of estimating the uncertainty surrounding the emissions 
is to combine estimates for the uncertainty (such as the standard deviation) for 
each input parameter. More elaborate ways consist of simulations (such as 'Monte 
Carlo' methods) to handle non-normal distributions, correlations between input 
parameters and extreme uncertainties (Rypdal and Winiwarter 2001). Uncertainties 
can be assessed under full greenhouse gas accounting (Nilsson et al. 2000), option-
ally even including checks with top-down atmospheric measurements, or under 
partial greenhouse gas accounting as proposed by the IPCC (2000). Uncertainties 
can be also used for verification of the levels of emissions as well differences over 
time (trend). The goal of level verification is to verify that emission levels in a 
target year (say 2010) are different from those in 1990, whereas trend verification 
concerns the verifiability of the emission reduction achieved. For the latter temporal 
correlations are taken into account, which explains that trend uncertainties are at 
least by a factor two smaller than level uncertainties. 
To our knowledge, we differ from the exiting literature in various ways. First we 
assume that uncertainty levels surrounding emission estimates need to be included 
when determining whether the emission targets are met in a verifiable manner. 
Second, we explicitly allow investment in monitoring to reduce uncertainty on top 
154 ODD GODAL ET AL. 
of domestic emission abatement as well as emission trading. Finally, we offer both 
an analytical and numerical analysis. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to examine the equilibrium condi-
tions for the carbon permit market given the fact that emission levels are uncertain 
but uncertainty can be reduced by improved monitoring at a cost. Second, to 
apply the method using data on the major industrial Parties of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section two derives the optimality conditions 
for market equilibrium to be achieveq. Section three presents the data used in 
the analysis. In Section four we present and discuss the numerical results of our 
assessment. Section five concludes. 
2. Methodology 
We first define the necessary set of variables. Let 
C;(X;): 
d;(ui): 
= 1, .. ., n be Parties (or sources) of the Kyoto Protocol; 
= the reported emissions at source i; 
= the uncertain volume of emissions at source i; 
= the costs of reducing reported emissions down to, x;; 
the cost of reducing uncertain volume of emissions down to u;, 
(through investing in monitoring); 
= the amount of emission permits acquired by source i (y; is negative 
if i is a net supplier of permits) and 
the Kyoto target for source i. 
In our model we separate the decision problem each Party faces in two stages. 
First, for a given amount of permits, each Party has to decide whether to spend 
resources on abating emissions or on investing in monitoring. This individual 
decision subproblem involves choosing parameters that do not require the infor-
mation from any other Party, and we assume that the Party therefore can perform a 
regular optimization on this problem. Secondly, the Party needs to decide whether 
or not to exchange emission permits with other Parties. For the individual optimiza-
tion problem discussed above, we define the least costs for Party i to comply with 
the Protocol for a given amount of permits, y;, as the minimization of emission 
reduction costs and monitoring costs: 
f;(y;) :=min [c;(x;) + d;(u;)] (1) 
Xj,Uj 
s.t. x; + u; :;:;: K; + y;, for all i. (2) 
Assume that the cost functions c;(x;) and d;(u;) are positive, decreasing, convex 
in x; and u; respectively. For simplicity of notation, we also assume that these 
functions are continuously differentiable. With this formulation, marginal costs 
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<Cx;) and d;(u;) are negative in X; and u; respectively, hence being positive in 
reducing x; and u;. We note that constraint (2) will hold with equality in the realistic 
case where 1<(+0)1 and ld;C+O)I are sufficiently large such that optimal u;(y) and 
X; (y) for given y; are strictly positive. Furthermore, as f; (y;) is the minimum of two 
convex functions subject to a linear constraint with respect to decision variable x;, 
and u;, then from general convexity analysis we know that the function f; (y;) is 
convex. Hence, the reduced functionf;(y;) is positive, convex and decreasing. By 
substituting (2) in (1) through eliminating x; we obtain: 
(3) 
Then, by making use of the envelope theorem on (3) we obtain 
(4) 
If substituting (2) in (1) through eliminating u; we would equivalently obtain 
(5) 
Let u;(y), x;(y) be optimal solution of subproblem (1), (2), i.e., reported emissions 
and the optimal volume of uncertainty for given y;. As ( 4) is equivalent to (5), we 
obtain the optimality condition, namely that <(x; (y; )) = d; (u; (y; )). This states that 
in the cost-minimum for each source i, the marginal cost of reducing emissions 
down to x;(y) will be equal to the marginal costs of reducing the uncertain emis-
sions down to u;(y). If not, the total costs for Party i of reaching K; for a given 
amount of permits, y;, could be lowered. 
Minimizing (1) subject to (2) by setting up the Lagrangian, and applying the 
envelope theorem to this scheme we obtain the condition that 
f;'(y;) =-A;, (6) 
where A; is the Lagrangian multiplier and is interpreted as the shadow price, or the 
willingness to pay to Party i, for relaxing constraint (2) with one unit, i.e. , the right 
to emit one more unit of reported or uncertain emissions. We note that A; is strictly 
positive if c;(x;) and d;(u;) are strictly decreasing. Otherwise, A; could be equal 
to zero. According to (6), the marginal change in the minimum cost of complying 
with the Protocol by a unit increase in y;, (which is negative) is also equal to - A; . 
Hence according to (4) to (6), for a given Yi> the value of one additional permit is 
equal to the marginal cost of holding reported or uncertain emissions down to the 
optimal level. Outside equilibrium A; will differ between two or more Parties; i.e. 
they have different willingness to pay for a permit, thus making trading in permits 
in a mutual beneficial way possible. 
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This brings us to the main optimization problem, which involves finding the 
permit vector, or distribution of permits, that realizes the global least cost solution. 
We define: 
n 
F(y) := L f;(y;) (7) 
i=l 
as the total or social costs for reaching the agreement for a given vector of permits, 
y, wheref;(y;) are defined in (1). If we had a socials planner that knew f;(y;) for all 
I she could minimize (7) subject to: 
n 
LYi=O 
i=l 
by setting up the Lagrangian, which would yield the first order condition: 
f/(yi) = -µ,foralli. 
(8) 
(9) 
Condition (9) states that the marginal value of a permit (the permit price) shall in 
equilibrium be equal to a specific level-µ, among all parties. Combining equations 
(4) to (6) and (9) implies that the necessary condition for a market equilibrium in 
the permit market is that the permit price equals marginal emission reductions costs 
and equals the marginal costs of improved monitoring. In addition, condition (2) 
has to hold: the reported plus the uncertain volume of emissions has to be equal to 
Kyoto target plus the net emission permits bought. 
It can be shown that, in the absence of transaction costs and irreversibilities, a 
system of bilateral, sequential trading converges to the global least cost solution 
(see Ermoliev et al. 2000). Although we believe that evidence on sulfur trading 
in the USA (Klaassen and Nentjes 1997) and carbon trading (Atkinson 2001) 
indicates that most trading occurs in a bilateral, sequential fashion, we will not 
elaborate on this here since the focus of this paper is on the impact of including 
improved monitoring possibilities (to reduce uncertainty on emissions) on the 
equilibrium outcome of emission trading and not on trade dynamics. 
In Figure 1 we give a graphical presentation of how we model the uncertain 
emissions. The vertical axis depicts the marginal abatement cost function for 
reducing x and u, (i.e., c'(x) and d'(u) respectively). Without uncertain emissions 
and trading the source would have to reduce reported emissions to the level 
K. When uncertain emissions are included in the emission inventory the source 
has to keep the sum of u and x below the Kyoto target. Then after optimizing 
between abating reported emissions and investing in monitoring, reported emis-
sions increase to x*, while the uncertain volume of emissions decreases to u*, 
satisfying the constraint x* + u* = K, (y = 0) while minimizing the costs of reaching 
the target. In Figure 1 trading in permits would graphically be the same as changing 
the Kyoto target for this particular source. The choice of a non-stochastic model of 
uncertainty was motivated by the simplicity of this analysis and availability of data. 
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Figure 1. Graphical presentation of the setting. 
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Kyoto target 
The general case of stochastic uncertainty requires a more sophisticated analysis, 
although qualitatively the effects of uncertainty are similar. 
3. Data 
To apply the model described in Section 2, we employ data on the costs of 
emissions reductions estimated from the POLES model (see Gusbin et al. 1999) 
for the countries (or group of countries) of USA, Japan, EU-15 and Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE, consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania). We also include Russia and Ukraine into the 
analysis. The cost functions for the latter two countries were derived from the 
results of the POLES model for the Former Soviet Union, using additional informa-
tion on emissions from Victor et al. (1998). All emission reduction cost functions 
employed in the numerical analysis only consider energy related carbon emissions 
reductions. Other carbon sources or GHG emissions are disregarded. The countries 
included in the analysis constitute the major participants of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Piecewise linear marginal cost functions were fitted to the dataset as shown in 
Figure 2. We use the following notation: One metric ton (t), carbon (C), United 
States dollars (US$, in 1990 prices), Million (M), and Billion (B). 
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Figure 2. Marginal costs of reducing emissions as a function of the emission level relative to 
the Kyoto target (US$ per tC). Russia and Ukraine are difficult to separate, as they are almost 
superimposed on each other. 
As mentioned in the introduction the availability of reliable data on the 
uncertainty surrounding the emissions and the costs of reducing the uncertainty 
through monitoring is still limited. We have implemented estimates for C02 emis-
sions based on estimates of the most recent studies. Rypdal and Zang (2000) have 
conducted the most in depth analysis of uncertainties of all GHGs on a national 
scale. According to their estimates, Norway shows a trend uncertainty for all GHGs 
of ±5%. Norway's level uncertainty of all GHGs was estimated to be ±21 % in 
1990 and ±17% in 2010. Following the IPCC report on Greenhouse Gas Inven-
tories (IPCC 2000), uncertainty assessments have been made available for other 
countries such as Austria, Europe, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, 
and Ukraine (Jonas and Nilsson 2002; Weiss et al. 2000; Winiwarter and Orthhofer 
2000; Winiwarter and Rypdal 2001 ; Charles et al. 1998; Van Amstel et al. 2000; 
Nilsson et al. 2000; Gawin 2001; Kulik 2001; Cozijnsen 2002). The uncertainty 
values listed in Table I are in line with the above mentioned references for the 
EU, CEE countries, Russia and the Ukraine. For the US we used the IPCC (2000) 
default uncertainty which is at the upper range of recent US estimates (IEA 2001). 
For Japan we lack information and we conjecture Japan's uncertainty to be between 
that of the US uncertainty level and that of the EU. 
We also made some simplifying assumptions on the costs of reducing the 
uncertainty surrounding emission which fit reasonably well with the information on 
the monitoring costs of the sulfur emission-trading program in the USA (Klaassen 
and Nentjes 1997: 135). The numerical results presented in Section 4 are based 
on these estimates and should therefore be considered as illustrative. The piece-
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Table I. Uncertain emissions as percentage of reported business as usual emission 
levels in 2010. Percent(%) and levels (MtC) 
USA EU Japan CEE Russia Ukraine Total 
Share ofBAU, a(%) 10 20 15 
Level (MtC) 169 219 61 
25 
51 
30 
143 
30 
39 
17 
681 
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wise linear marginal cost functions of investing in monitoring infrastructure are 
parameterized in a simplistic manner (see Figure 1). Consider the marginal cost 
function of reducing reported emissions; c; (xd = ai + bi *Xi, and the marginal 
cost functions of reducing uncertain volume of emissions; d;Cui) =Pi+ q;*ui. We 
assume that the marginal cost of reducing uncertain volume of emissions at the 
initial levels defined in Table I are zero. Then we assume that the marginal cost 
of reducing the uncertain emissions at any percent of the initial level ( u? = a i u?) 
is the same as the marginal cost of reducing the reported emissions with the same 
percentage of the initial level (BAUi). When employing this scheme, the values of 
the parameters Pi and qi are such that pi= ai and qi= -ail(ai*x?). This formulation 
of d;Cui) represents therefore just a rescaling of the slope of c;Cxi), such that di(ui) 
= O"i[Cj(XiJ for all i. 
4. Results 
In our numerical experiments we used the procedure of sequential bilateral trades 
as a specific optimization method for solving problems (7)-(8). In contrast to the 
standard optimization software it is rather flexible for conducting experiments. 
Besides, it also provides insights into the possible dynamics of trades. Since the 
main contribution of our paper is however on the impact of improved monitoring 
to reduce uncertainty (at a costs) on the performance of emission trading we will 
not address the trade dynamics at length but instead focus on the analysis of the 
equilibrium outcomes. 
Below we present the results of various simulations. First we simulate the 
market in a traditional way excluding the uncertain emissions (the base case). 
This is therefore just a numerical application of the scheme described in Ermoliev 
et al. (2000). Both the initial and equilibrium states as well as the dynamics of 
the trading process itself are briefly described. Then we include the uncertain 
emissions, and show the results for the choice between emission abatement and 
improved monitoring in a setting with and without emission trading. Finally, we 
present some sensitivity analysis where only parts of the uncertain emissions are 
included. 
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Table II. Emissions, marginal costs and total costs before and after trade 
USA EU Japan CEE Russia Ukraine Total 
Emissions (MtC) 
Kyoto target 1,325 867 295 267 650 178 3,582 
BAU 1,690 1,097 404 203 475 130 3,999 
After trade 1,487 1,003 373 187 418 114 3,582 
Traded a 162 136 78 -80 -232 -64 376 
Marginal costs (US$ per tC) 
Before trade 85 133 248 0 0 0 
After trade 38.6 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 
Emission reduction costs 
(Million US$ per year) 
Without trading 13,468 13,032 10,873 0 0 0 37,373 
With trading 3,907 1,722 556 308 915 248 7,658 
Total savings after trade 29,698 
almplies current net amount volume bought. 
4.1. PERFECT OBSERVATIONS OF EMISSIONS - BASE CASE 
The base case is where we assume that the uncertain volume of emissions is not 
included in the agreement. Parties can then comply with the protocol only by 
reducing emissions and by trading permits. Some of the key figures before the 
first and after the last trade are presented in Table II. 
Table II shows that CEE, Russia and Ukraine can meet their targets without 
implementing any control measure, as their targets are higher than their BAU emis-
sions. Before trading, Japan has marginal costs of emission reduction of around 250 
US$ per tC, the EU of 130 and the USA 85 US$ per tC. Total costs before trading 
are 37 ,400 Million US$. After trading, marginal costs settle around 38.5 US$ per 
tC in all countries. More than 50% of the committed reductions in the USA, EU 
and Japan are bought from CEE, Russia and Ukraine during trade. 
The total savings realized from trade is computable, and estimated to be 29,700 
Million US$ per year. Total costs of reaching the aggregate target are thus reduced 
by approximately 80% as a result of trading. The relatively large reduction in total 
costs illustrates why carbon trading is attractive in an economic context. 
In terms of the dynamics, cost reductions from each trade are larger in the early 
stages of trade than towards the end. Parties have larger differences in marginal 
costs in the beginning making the cost saving potentials greater than towards the 
end. This observation is typical for trading in many commodities. The total benefits 
from trading are larger the more different Parties are. To give a better view of how 
the path towards equilibrium varies in different simulations, the model was run 5G 
times. The results indicate that in the simulation with the slowest convergence trade 
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Figure 3. Change in total costs as a function of the number of bilateral agreements in 50 
simulations (Billion US$ per year). 
stopped after 153 bilateral agreements, the fastest at 80 trades, 90% being between 
93 and 143 trades (see Figure 3). 
4.2. IMPERFECT OBSERVATIONS OF EMISSIONS 
We now introduce imperfect observation of emissions into the calculations. The 
rules of the agreement are now such that Parties need to find the least cost combina-
tion of reducing reported emissions, x, reducing the uncertain volume of emissions, 
u (by investing in monitoring) and by trading in emission permits, y, such that 
constraint (2) is satisfied. In Table III we present the initial situation before emis-
sion trading starts but after each Party has optimized between reducing reported 
and uncertain emissions. 
Table III shows that marginal cost of each country of reducing reported emis-
sions and of investing in monitoring are equal, in accordance with the analysis in 
Section 2. The marginal costs are in the range of 0-400 US$ per tC, consider-
ably higher than when only reported emissions are included in the targets. This is 
because the need for reductions in reported emissions is now considerably larger. 
We also note that the "hot air" we had in the previous simulation now is reduced 
since the uncertain emissions are now added to the baseline emissions. Table III 
also shows that without trading the monitoring costs would be 15.9 Billion US$ and 
abatement costs would be around 99 Billion US$. This implies that the monitoring 
costs would be around 16% of the abatement costs. This estimate fits very well 
with the costs of (continuous emission) monitoring of the sulfur trading program 
in the USA that were estimated to equal 8 to 13% of the abatement costs (Klaassen 
and Nentjes 1997). 
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Table III. Emissions, marginal costs and total costs before trading with imperfect observation of 
emissions 
USA EU Japan CEE Russia Ukraine Total 
Emissions, (MtC) 
Reported 1,197 717 253 214 500 137 3,017 
Uncertain 128 150 42 53 150 41 564 
Total emissions 1,325 867 295 267 650 178 3,582 
Marginal costs (US$ per tC) 
Of emission reduction 127.9 242.8 395.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Of monitoring 127.9 242.8 395.6 0.0 0 .0 0.0 
Costs (Million US$ per year) 
Emission reduction costs 27,103 47,102 24,093 0 0 0 99,108 
Monitoring costs 2,710 9,420 3,736 0 0 0 15,866 
Total costs ( excl. permits) 29,813 56,522 28,639 0 0 0 114,974 
After trading, marginal costs reach 130 US$ per tC and are about 3 times higher 
than in the base case (without uncertain emissions and without trading) (see Table 
N). This is because all Parties now have to do considerably more abatement, as 
the uncertainty on emissions has to be accounted for. This is an obvious result once 
one recognizes that including the upper range of uncertainty in the Kyoto cap is 
equivalent to lowering the cap. The increase in the price is so dramatic since the 
net emission reduction under the Kyoto Protocol without uncertainty would only be 
417 MtC (Million ton carbon). This is due to the fact that Russia, Ukraine and CEE 
can offer 287 MtC at zero marginal costs since their business-as-usual emissions 
are much lower (the so called "hot air") than their Kyoto targets (compare Table 
II). Adding an average uncertainty of 17% is equivalent to an additional volume of 
emissions of 681 MtC to be reduced. To reduce this extra amount no "hot air" is 
available anymore and significant additional emissions reductions need to be made 
at those parts of the cost curves that are relatively steep (see Figure 2) . 
An important diff ererice compared to the case of perfect emission observation is 
that the USA now become a net permit supplier even though the quantity is small. 
This is because the rate of change in marginal costs in USA is lower than in the 
EU and Japan and because the assumed uncertainty of the emissions in the USA 
is lower. Comparing the situation before and after trade we see that the volume 
of uncertain emissions decreases by approximately 1 %. Trading in permits leads 
to increased emission abatement and monitoring investments in permit exporting 
countries. This effect on the total level of uncertain emissions is larger than the 
effect of higher volumes of uncertain emission levels in permit importing countries. 
Total abatement costs after trade are approximately eight times higher compared 
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Table N. Emissions, marginal costs and aggregate costs after all trades with imperfect observation 
of emissions 
USA EU Japan CEE Russia Ukraine Total 
Emissions, (MtC) 
Reported 1,188 869 333 154 376 103 3,023 
Uncertain 127 182 52 39 124 34 559 
Total emissions 1,315 1,052 385 193 500 137 3,582 
Amount tradeda -10 185 90 -74 -150 -41 275 
Marginal costs (US$ per tC) 
Of emission reduction 130.9 130.8 130.2 130.4 130.l 130.9 
Of monitoring 130.9 130.8 130.2 130.4 130. l 130.9 
Costs (Million US$ per year) 
Emission reduction costs 28,270 12,708 3,842 3,046 4,330 1,182 53,378 
Monitoring costs 2,827 2,542 576 761 1,299 355 8,360 
Total costs (excl. permits) 31,097 15,250 4,418 3,807 5,629 1,537 61,738 
Total savings due to trade 53,235 
a Implies net amount bought. 
to the situation where (the estimated) uncertain volume of emissions would have 
been excluded. The marginal cost functions on emission reduction are, as shown 
in Figure 2, quite linear in the range 38.5 to 130 US$ per tC. Therefore when the 
marginal costs in the equilibrium state increase by approximately three times, the 
level of the annual abatement costs, i.e. the area under the marginal cost curve 
can be expected to increase about nine times, as this relationship is quadratic. 
However the additional option to meet targets through investing in monitoring and 
thus reducing the uncertainty on emissions reduces this factor from nine to eight. 
The cost savings due to trading in this case are 53.2 Billion US$, or 46% compared 
to the situation without trading. 
Uncertainty on emissions will be present whether the uncertainty is included 
in the commitments or not. However, when included in the Protocol, the total 
emission levels without abatement would be higher and the required emission 
reduction larger, changing the constraint of the minimization problem (equation 
(2) in Section 2). The results in Table II, ill and IV should therefore be compared 
cautiously as they describe solutions of two very different minimization problems. 
4.3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Bearing in mind the reluctance of some Parties to ratify the Kyoto Protocol as 
it currently is formulated, it seems unrealistic that these Parties will agree to a 
scheme where the estimated uncertainty on emissions is fully included in each 
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Figure 4. Marginal costs (US$/ton C) after trade as function of the share of the uncertain 
volume of emissions included in the agreement. 
Party's target as described above since this would significantly lower the implicit 
Kyoto cap. The costs of complying with the agreement would increase dramatically 
for some Parties. For this reason we explore some more moderate versions of the 
above scheme. We simulate the model assuming that only a specific part of the 
uncertainty on emissions is included (10%, 20% ... ). This is equivalent to saying 
that given that there are different estimates surrounding the uncertainty, instead 
of using the highest estimate the Parties to the Protocol may agree on using the 
median or even lower estimates. The final marginal cost in each case is shown in 
Figure 4. 
The points in Figure 4 between 50 and 150 US$ per tC lay on a straight line 
because the piecewise linear cost functions in this range as presented include only 
one line. With a finer grid for these functions in this interval, the curve in Figure 4 
would increase more rapidly. 
Furthermore, to give some indications on how the various Parties may gain or 
lose from including various amounts of the uncertain emissions into the scheme, 
we estimate the total costs for each Party including the expenses/revenues from 
the permit trade. As pointed out above, we have no unique permit price in our 
scheme. In the following calculations we therefore apply the marginal cost after 
trade as a proxy for this parameter. Figure 5 shows that as the amount of uncertain 
emissions increases, the costs rise quite rapidly for USA, EU and Japan. In these 
cases, the costs increase both because more reductions will be carried out at home 
and because the expenses on emission permits purchases increases as all Parties 
have higher marginal costs. In terms of total costs, EU is the most severely affected 
CARBON TRADING wITH IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE EMISSIONS 
50 
40 
30 
!!3 
"' 0 
u 
165 
-EU 
-x-USA 
---+-Japan 
·· ·•···Ukraine 
- · O . CEE 
-r-Russia 
··-·. ·~ t. · · : '. ·~ · :. ·: : ~··:: ·t:. : :·~ ... ··:· · _· : :~ · -- . :~· · · --·~·-· ~ - ~ 
-10 
-20 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Share of uncertain volum: of emissions included 
Figure 5. Change in the net total costs as a function of the share of the uncertain volume of 
emissions included in the Protocol after trading (Billion US$ per year. 
due to the assumption of larger levels of uncertain emissions in combination with 
a relatively steep marginal cost function. 
For Russia, Ukraine and CEE, the (net) costs of complying with the Protocol 
before including uncertainty on emissions are negative, i.e. they make positive 
profits. This is because the value of the permits sold is higher than the costs of 
emission reductions and monitoring investments. The more surprising finding here 
is that these countries may actually benefit from including uncertainty on emis-
sions in the agreement even though these countries are assumed to have the highest 
share of these uncertain emissions. As uncertain emissions are gradually included, 
this negative effect on profits is dominated by the increase in permit price, which 
contributes to higher profits on permits sold. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, 
profits are increased to its maximum (being 80--100% higher than in the base case 
without uncertain emissions) when 80% of the uncertain emissions were to be 
included in the Protocol. From this point, the effect of the increased permit price 
is less important than the need for reductions, making profits fall slightly. For CEE 
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however, the positive effect from the higher permit price dominates in all cases the 
effect of the need for larger reductions. This is because CEE is assumed to have a 
lower share of uncertain emissions than Russia and Ukraine. Of course one should 
be aware that who gains or loose depends on the way uncertainty is treated in the 
model and on the actual uncertainties included. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this paper was to examine the outcome of the carbon permit market 
given uncertain emission levels and the possibility to reduce this uncertainty by 
investing in monitoring and to apply this method for the Kyoto Protocol. In the 
analytical part we derive the equilibrium conditions. In the equilibrium, the permit 
price has to be equal the marginal costs of abatement as well as the marginal 
costs of improved monitoring. In addition, reported emissions plus the uncertainty 
surrounding emissions (the uncertain emissions) have to be equal to the emission 
target plus any net permits bought. 
Our main findings regarding the application of the model suggest that when 
uncertainty on emissions is included in the Kyoto agreement, in the way we 
envisage by reducing the uncertain volume of emissions from the allowed Kyoto 
target, and when countries can reduce the uncertainty through investing in monitor-
ing, marginal emission reduction costs would increase. Compliance costs may even 
increase significantly for the USA, the EU and Japan since the options for buying 
cheap emission permits are restricted. Quite surprisingly we find that Russia, 
Ukraine and CEE might experience financial gains when uncertainty on emissions 
were to be included in the Protocol commitment. This is so because the resulting 
rise in the permit price and associated revenues outbalances the need for additional 
monitoring and domestic emission reduction costs due the larger levels of uncertain 
emissions. Perhaps also surprisingly, we also find that trading in carbon permits, 
in this particular setting, may also lead to a reduction in the volume of uncertain 
emissions and hence, reduce the overall uncertainty in emissions. This is so since 
improved monitoring is to a certain degree cost-effective. 
It is important to note the limitations of this analysis. First, not all Parties of 
the Kyoto Protocol are included in our numerical analysis. The omitted (industrial-
ized) countries are in aggregate likely to be net buyers of permits, which gives 
rise to higher equilibrium marginal cost than our results indicate. Moreover, the 
opposite effect would be expected if emission trading would be expa.nded to devel-
oping countries since these are likely to act as net sellers thus reducing the permit 
price (compare Gusbin et al. 2000). In addition including more carbon sources 
and sinks, as well as emissions of other greenhouse gases would also improve 
the numerical analysis. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the data 
on business as usual emissions are uncertain, as are the marginal cost functions 
for reducing reported emissions. Especially the figures used for the uncertainty 
on emissions are themselves uncertain. Moreover, as indicated in section 3 we 
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have implicitly assumed that reported emissions and the uncertainty surrounding 
the emissions, in optimum, are reduced in the same proportions. If the cost for 
reducing the uncertainty were higher (for a given level of uncertainty) than we 
assumed, including the uncertainty in the targets would result in smaller reduc-
tions in uncertainty, larger reductions in reported emissions and higher permit 
prices than we have calculated. This would increase compliance costs for permit 
importing countries. The effect on compliance costs for permit-exporting countries 
is ambiguous, since higher permit prices and less flexibility in meeting targets work 
in different direction. Finally, we recognize that our data on the cost functions 
for reducing reported emissions including the baseline emission levels in 2010 
could depend on how the uncertainty on emissions is modeled. Such changes 
in baseline emissions and cost functions were not considered here. Although 
the actual levels of costs when uncertainty on emissions is included should be 
considered as illustrative, our findings on the direction of change are probably more 
reliable. 
Nevertheless, it is good to recall that the treatment of uncertainty on emission 
levels and compliance is still an open issue in the Kyoto Protocol. In spite of the 
above limitations, this study has given some insights on how the distribution and 
level of compliance costs may change (and perhaps significantly) if uncertainty on 
actual emissions were to be included in a verification mechanism under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
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